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§4.23

Subsequent Remedial Measures Generally Excluded

FRE 407 bars evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence, culpable conduct,
product or design defects, or the need for a warning or instruction. For example, evidence that
defendant made repairs at a place where plaintiff had sustained injuries in an accident cannot be
proved in a later lawsuit to prove that defendant was negligent in maintaining the place at the time
of the accident.
Reasons to exclude
Such evidence is excluded for three reasons. First, the fact that a party made repairs after an
accident may not indicate negligence or fault. Often premises or instrumentalities that are safe can
be made safer, and a party undertaking repairs may be employing a higher standard of safety than
due care requires. Second, even if subsequent repair tends to show negligence, there is a strong
social policy to encourage people and companies to make such repairs to enhance the safety of
others. Parties might be deterred from undertaking them if their efforts could be used against them
in a later suit arising out of an accident. 1 Finally, regardless whether FRE 407 encourages parties
to undertake subsequent remedial measures, it seems unfair to penalize them for socially
responsible conduct.
What seems the most important rationale (encouraging subsequent repairs) is open to
considerable doubt. Most ordinary citizens are unaware of FRE 407 and do not consult a lawyer
in deciding whether to undertake repairs. And it is doubtful that large manufacturers, even if welladvised and familiar with litigation, need the incentive of FRE 407 to make their products safer.
They are likely to do so regardless of evidentiary consequences in order to prevent further injuries
and lawsuits and avoid the possibility that inaction in the face of repeated accidents or injuries will
itself be taken as proof of negligence, or even as the basis for the award of punitive damages.
Evidence of subsequent remedial measures satisfies the liberal relevancy standard of FRE 401 and
at least sometimes does tend to prove negligence or culpable conduct, and therefore some state
counterparts of FRE 407 take precisely the opposite approach. 2
Remedial measures
The term “remedial measures” in FRE 407 and its state counterparts is interpreted broadly to

§4.23 1. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (rationale behind FRE 407 is that “people in
general would be less likely to take subsequent remedial measures if their repairs or improvements would be used
against them in a lawsuit arising out of a prior accident”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080. See also ACN, FRE 407 (most
important ground for exclusion is “social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety”).
2. See Rhode Island Rule 407 (“When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is admissible.”).

include changes in design, 3 installation of protective devices, 4 new warnings, 5 removal of
dangerous conditions, 6 revision of contracts, 7 changes in policies 8 or regulations 9 or procedures or
protocol, 10 and discipline 11 or dismissal of employees. 12 It also includes instructions to take
remedial measures, 13 but post-event investigations, tests, or reports are not themselves subsequent
3. Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1989) (wiring change on bacon slicer); Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981) (modification of transmission), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960.
4. Reddin v. Robinson Property Group Ltd. Partnership, 239 F.3d 756, 760 (5th Cir. 2001) (area of fall on gambling
barge taped off afterwards).
5. Chlopek v. Federal Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) (modified warning label).
6. Rush v. Troutman Investment Co., 121 Or. App. 355, 854 P.2d 968 (1993) (manager ordered clothing rack
removed that had injured plaintiff).
7. R. M. Perlman v. N.Y. Coat, Suit, Union Local 89-22-1, 33 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir. 1994) (letter from union
suggesting changes in contract clause could not be used to prove clause was unlawful; recommendation in letter was
subsequent remedial measure); Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975) (deletion of
anticompetitive provision from distributor contracts after they were challenged), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908.
8. Pastor v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 487 F.3d 1042, 1045 (7th Cir. 2007) (change in language of
insurance policy stating that “day” meant 24 hours could not be used to prove that “day” in earlier version of
contract meant “any part of a day”; such use would violate FRE 407 by “discouraging efforts to clarify contractual
obligations” and “perpetuating any confusion caused by unclarified language”).
9. Ford v. Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408, 410-411 (7th Cir. 1978) (change in prison regulations after incident giving rise to
suit), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870; SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 52 (2d Cir. 1976) (new company regulation
concerning brokerage practices).
10. Estate of Hamilton v. City of New York, 627 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 2010) (excluding proof that management
involved more people in employment process to lessen feeling in unsuccessful candidates that they were unfairly
passed over).
11. Specht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700, 701-702 (10th Cir. 1988) (in civil rights action, evidence excluded that city had
stated that “appropriate disciplinary action would be taken” against officers); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792
F.2d 1408, 1417-1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (excluding evidence of disciplinary proceeding against police officer because
it was a remedial measure).
12. Nolan v. Memphis City Sch., 589 F.3d 257, 273-274 (6th Cir. 2009) (evidence that employer “subsequently
discharged an employee accused of causing a plaintiff’s injury may be properly excluded as a subsequent remedial
measure” under FRE 407).
13. Rush v. Troutman Inv. Co., 121 Or. App. 355, 854 P.2d 968 (1993) (“Instructions to take remedial measures are

remedial measures excluded by the Rule, 14 even where they lead to later adoption of such
measures. 15
Third-party and mandated measures
Despite the broad language of FRE 407, the prevailing view is that third-party remedial
measures or repairs are not covered by the exclusionary principle, which means (for example) that
plaintiffs suing manufacturers may prove remedial measures undertaken by employers or owners
of the equipment or processes that caused the injury, who are not themselves being sued. 16 Some
courts recognize an even broader exemption, holding that only “voluntary” remedial measures are
covered by FRE 407, 17 with the result that measures mandated by governmental or regulatory
authority (such as many product recalls) are not covered because they do not represent selfmotivated socially responsible behavior of the sort that FRE 407 seeks to encourage. 18 Arguably,
however, voluntary product recalls undertaken by manufacturers on their own are and should be
covered by the principle, even though undertaken under the pressure of a legal regime that might
impose liability if the defect goes uncorrected. In any event, proof of recalls is sometimes excluded

themselves remedial measures.”).
14. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Div. of Textron, Inc., 805 F.2d 907, 918-919
(10th Cir. 1986) (it “would strain the spirit of the remedial measure prohibition in Rule 407 to extend its shield to
evidence contained in post-event tests or reports” as distinguished from actual remedial measures). Mere tests or
reports do not fit FRE 407 because they do not make the event giving rise to the claim “less likely to occur.”
15. Prentiss & Carlisle v. Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1992) (FRE 407 does not bar evidence of a
party’s post-accident analysis of its products, even though “the analysis may often result in remedial measures being
taken”).
16. Diehl v. Blaw-Knox, 360 F.3d 426, 429-430 (3d Cir. 2004) (error to exclude evidence that owner of machine,
who was not a party, made post-accident modifications to prevent similar accidents in future; FRE 407 does not
apply to evidence of remedial measures taken by a nonparty); Buchanna v. Diehl Machine, Inc., 98 F.3d 366, 369
(8th Cir. 1996) (in suit against maker of saw, proof that plaintiff’s employer installed T-guard after accident
supported finding of liability and was not excludable under FRE 407).
17. Millennium Partners, L.P. v. Colmar Storage, LLC, 494 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (FRE 407 does not apply to
remedial measures “taken without the voluntary participation of the defendant”).
18. O’Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing exception “for evidence of remedial
action mandated by superior government authority”); In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir.
1989) (purpose of FRE 407 “is not implicated in cases involving subsequent measures in which the defendant did
not voluntarily participate”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1017. See generally Note, The “Superior Authority Exception”
to Federal Rule of Evidence 407: The “Remedial Measure” Required to Clarify a Confused State of Evidence, 1991
U. Ill. L. Forum 843.

under FRE 403, and findings and communications mandating recalls raise hearsay issues. 19
Subsequent measures
As originally enacted, FRE 407 left room to argue that a “subsequent” measure reaches steps
taken after the date of the manufacture of the product that caused the injury, rather than after the
accident. 20 This argument was eliminated by a 1997 amendment defining subsequent to mean
“after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event.” The restyled Rule restates the same
limitation in different language by applying only to measures taken “that would have made an
earlier injury or harm less likely to occur.” Hence a remedial measure taken after manufacture of
a product but before plaintiff’s injury is not covered, 21 although proof of such a measure is
sometimes excludable under FRE 403. 22 Some courts admit evidence of a modification planned
before plaintiff’s accident even though implemented afterwards. 23
The policy of FRE 407 arguably applies only to remedial measures taken in response to an
accident, and some authority holds that measures taken after plaintiff’s accident are not excludable
if defendant was unaware of it and no claim had yet been made. 24
19. Compare Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1980) (drug label changes made in
response to FDA pressure excludable under FRE 403) with Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21-22 (4th
Cir. 1988) (recall of automobiles was covered by FRE 407). Official findings underlying government-required
remedial measures are hearsay, but they may fit FRE 803(8)(C). See §8.50, infra.
20. Compare Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1481 (10th Cir. 1990) (“wording and history of
Rule 407” make it clear that “event” refers to “the time of the accident or injury to the plaintiff, not to the time of
manufacture of the product or creation of the hazard”) with Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 11971198 (3d Cir. 1987) (no abuse of discretion to exclude warning decals that were added subsequent to manufacture
but prior to accident because offered on issue of foreseeability, and danger “must be foreseeable at the time of
sale”).
21. Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1991) (error to exclude changes to warning placard
and instruction manual made after sale but prior to accident); Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp., 901 F.2d 42, 44 n.1
(5th Cir. 1989) (proper to admit evidence of change implemented in January 1984 where accident did not occur until
February 1984).
22. Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 481 (1st Cir. 1997) (trial judge may exclude
evidence of post-manufacture, pre-accident design modifications if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effects).
23. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991) (FRE 407 does not exclude evidence of
design modifications used on later model when these “were on the drawing board” before machine involved in
accident was made, but evidence properly excluded as more prejudicial than probative).
24. See, e.g., Van Gordon v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 693 P.2d 1285, 1289-1290 (Or. 1985) (evidence of new signs
posted after accident were not excludable “subsequent repairs” where defendant did not know of injury to plaintiff at
time they were posted).

Measures after similar accident
FRE 407 does not bar evidence of remedial measures taken after an accident similar to the one
giving rise to plaintiff’s claim but before plaintiff’s own accident (a point that is clear under the
1997 amendment, even if it was uncertain under the prior language). 25 Some pre-amendment
decisions had extended the protection of FRE 407 to remedial measures taken in response to earlier
accidents rather than the one giving rise to the claim in the instant case. 26 Sometimes, of course,
accidents or repairs prior to the event in suit may themselves be proved to show that defendant had
knowledge or notice of a dangerous situation, which may bear on negligence in design,
manufacture, or maintenance or may be relevant to claims of failure to warn or even recall a
product.
Strict liability claims
Originally FRE 407 barred evidence of subsequent remedial measures only when offered to
prove “negligence or culpable conduct,” inviting arguments that the Rule did not apply to strict
liability claims. Most federal circuits, however, applied FRE 407 in strict liability actions, 27 and
this approach was codified by a 1997 amendment to the Rule specifying that “evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in
a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction.”
By way of contrast, many state courts interpreting their state counterpart of original FRE 407
have taken the opposing view that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in strict
liability actions. 28 In some states, legislative commentary resolves the issue. 29

25. Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 96 (1st Cir. 1999) (“measures that take place before the accident
at issue do not fall within the prohibition”) (but excluding under FRE 403).
26. See Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277 (3d Cir. 1992) (policy of FRE 407 supports “exclusion of
evidence of safety measures taken before someone is injured by a newly manufactured product, even if those
measures are taken in response to experience with an older product of the same or similar design”).
27. Among pre-amendment federal cases taking the view that FRE 407 applies in strict liability cases, see Raymond
v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518 (1st Cir. 1991); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 960.
28. See, e.g., Forma Scientific, Inc. v. Biosera, Inc., 960 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1998); Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d
396, 411 (Alaska 1985); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 684 (Wis. 1977). But see Krause v.
American Aerolights, 762 P.2d 1011, 1015 n.6 (Or. 1988) (state counterpart of FRE 407 applies in products liability
actions; listing split of federal and state authorities on question).
29. Compare Commentary, N.C. R. Evid. 407 (“It is the intent of the Committee that the rule should apply to all
types of actions.”) with Committee Comment, Colo. R. Evid. 407 (“The phrase ‘culpable conduct’ is not deemed to
include proof of liability in a ‘strict liability’ case based on defect, where the subsequent measures are properly

The argument for applying FRE 407 to strict liability claims is that they raise many of the same
issues as a negligence claim. 30 Plaintiffs often assert both, and instructions could not be effective
in limiting juries to considering proof of subsequent remedial measures on the strict liability claim
but not the negligence claim. Moreover, the policies of FRE 407 are said to apply with full force
to strict liability claims in order to encourage manufacturers to make their products safer, or at
least to avoid deterring them from doing so. 31
Courts refusing to apply Rule 407 to strict liability claims take the view that manufacturers are
likely to make their product safer without the incentive provided by Rule 407. Remedial measures
are implemented regardless of whether they are later provable, simply to prevent future claims and
the possibility of punitive damage awards for failure to correct a known defect. 32 And in strict
liability cases, subsequent remedial measures often have particularly high probative value on the
question whether a product was designed defectively. Even if Rule 407 were applicable, evidence
of subsequent remedial measures is often admissible on the issue of feasibility. Rather than confuse
the jury with a limiting instruction directing them to distinguish between feasibility and liability,
arguably it is preferable to make the evidence generally admissible.
Erie issue
Since many states refuse to apply their own Rule 407 to strict liability claims, the issue arises
whether federal courts must defer to state law in diversity cases. Most federal courts hold that FRE
407 controls in diversity cases, and the 1997 amendment at least assumes that this view is correct. 33
A significant minority of pre-1997 decisions reached the opposite conclusion, insisting that state
counterparts should be honored. 34
admitted as evidence of the original defect.”).
30. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984) (strict liability is “something of a misnomer in
products cases” for liability exists only “if a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous,” which “bring[s] into
play factors of cost and risk similar to those that determine negligence”).
31. Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 886-889 (5th Cir. 1983) (assumption that admitting
design changes evidence would deter “is not demonstrably inapplicable to manufacturers”).
32. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148 (1974) (“manifestly
unrealistic” to suggest that a manufacturer “will forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image” because evidence of such improvement
may be admitted in suit).
33. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984) (excluding subsequent remedial
measure under FRE 407 and rejecting claim that Erie requires application of identical state rule interpreted by state
courts as being inapplicable in product cases); 1997 ACN to FRE 407 (speaking of a “uniform federal rule”
applicable in product cases, most of which are brought under state law).
34. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir. 1988) (whether to admit evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is based on policy considerations, so “it is governed by state law in diversity actions”). See also

The best argument for applying state law is that the issue is substantive and there is no federal
intent to legislate on substantive points relating to product liability, hence FRE 407 should not
apply even though no express language points toward this result. (It is not possible to argue that
this substantive area is beyond federal power to regulate, since Congress obviously could enter the
field of product liability. There is only an argument that Congress did not intend, when the Rules
were enacted and when FRE 407 was amended, to regulate this area.) The best argument for
applying federal law on this point is that there is no textual basis for refusing to apply FRE 407,
and the provision has a procedural component in preventing jury confusion and furthering the
cause of efficient and accurate fact ascertainment. 35

Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1989) (“not clear whether federal or state
law” applies). See generally Note, Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act: The Misapplication of Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 736 (1990) (endorsing minority view).
35. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984) (no deference to state law required in diversity
case because “substantive judgment that underlies Rule 407 is entwined with procedural considerations” and so
occupies “that borderland where procedure and substance are interwoven” that it passes muster under Hanna v.
Plumer).

